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RETHINKING THE “FORCE” BEHIND “FORCED
PROCREATION”: THE CASE FOR GIVING WOMEN
EXCLUSIVE DECISIONAL AUTHORITY OVER
THEIR CRYOPRESERVED PRE-EMBRYOS
INTRODUCTION
In March 2010, 39-year-old emergency room physician Karla Dun-
ston received news that everybody dreads—she was diagnosed with
cancer, specifically non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.1  Upon learning from
her doctors that chemotherapy would render her infertile, Karla took
steps to ensure she would be able to biologically reproduce after her
cancer had been treated.2  She asked her then-boyfriend of five
months, Jacob Szafranski, whom she had known for nine years, if he
would donate his sperm so that it could be combined with her eggs to
create embryos.3  Jacob agreed, and on April 6, 2010, three pre-em-
bryos were created from Jacob’s sperm and Karla’s eggs and cry-
opreserved, or frozen, for later implantation.4  After Karla began her
chemotherapy treatments, Jacob sent Karla a text message ending
their relationship.  On August 22, 2011, he filed a complaint seeking to
permanently enjoin Karla from using the pre-embryos.5
Karla and Jacob’s situation may seem like a storyline from the fu-
ture, but the data suggest that there are currently more than 600,000
cryopreserved pre-embryos in the United States alone.6  The first suc-
cessful birth to result from in vitro fertilization (IVF)7 occurred in
1. Bonnie Miller Rubin & Angie Leventis Lourgos, High-Tech Reproduction Gives Birth to
Court Case, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 2013, at 1, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-
09-18/health/ct-met-embryo-battle-20130918_1_frozen-embryos-high-tech-reproduction-court-
case.
2. Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
3. Rubin & Lourgos, supra note 1, at 1.  “Embryo and pre-embryo are both terms that are
used broadly to refer to all the early stages of development of a fertilized egg.” Embryo Facts,
MIRACLES WAITING, http://www.miracleswaiting.org/factsembryos.html#q1 (last visited Oct. 15,
2013).  “Embryo” is specifically used to refer to the stage of development between implantation
in the uterus and the eighth week of gestation. Id.  “Pre-embryo” is, therefore, usually used to
describe pre-implantation embryos. Id.
4. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 503–04.
5. Id. at 504–05.
6. Embryo Adoption, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-
opa-and-initiatives/embryo-adoption/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
7. The IVF procedure involves harvesting a woman’s eggs from her ovaries after priming their
growth with specific hormone medications. The Science of Egg Freezing, FROZEN EGG BANK,
INC., http://www.eggfreezing.com/egg-freezing.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).  The harvested
eggs are inseminated and become pre-embryos in the lab within three days. Id.  A number of
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1978,8 and since then, the popularity of the reproductive technology
has skyrocketed.9  The law, however, has not kept pace with the in-
creased popularity of IVF technology, particularly with regard to how
stored pre-embryos will be used or disposed of when parties disa-
gree.10  When the couple that created the pre-embryos no longer
agrees as to their disposition, as in Karla and Jacob’s circumstance, the
courts have had to decide the ultimate fate of those pre-embryos.11
The first state high court to consider this type of pre-embryo “cus-
tody battle” is Tennessee, in its seminal decision Davis v. Davis.12  The
Davis decision is critical to the historical evolution of case law con-
cerning disputes over frozen pre-embryos for two reasons: first, it pro-
pre-embryos are then transferred or frozen for later transfer. Id.  Even when the pre-embryos
are transferred immediately, however, surplus pre-embryos are usually created and also frozen.
Id.
8. Louise Brown, born in 1978, was the first person to be conceived in a laboratory. Id.
9. See Assisted Reproductive Technology, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last visited  Oct. 15, 2013).
10. Anna Stolley Persky, Reproductive Technology and the Law, WASH. LAW., July/Aug. 2012,
at 22, 23, 29, available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_
lawyer/august_2012/fertility.cfm.  Furthermore, federal laws addressing embryonic disposition
are largely nonexistent because the issue is viewed as being within the purview of the states. See
Theresa M. Erickson, Fertility Law, GPSOLO, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 56, 57–58, available at https://
www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_in
dex/erickson.html.  The federal laws that do exist on the topic of embryos emerge primarily in
the context of stem cell and cloning research, and even then, the focus is largely on the question
of federal funding, not regulation of embryo research as such. THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLO-
GIES 127–31 (2004).  Though state legislatures are more capable of addressing issues and policies
involving embryos, most of the state statutes that currently exist address the issue of parentage
rather than disposition.  Michael T. Flannery, “Rethinking” Embryo Disposition upon Divorce,
29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 278 (2013); see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-
B:13–B:15, 168-B:18 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring couples to undergo medical examinations and
counseling, and imposing a fourteen-day limit for maintenance of ex-utero pre-embryos). But see
FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2014) (requiring couples to execute written agreements for disposition in
event of death, divorce, or other unforeseen circumstances).
11. A potential ex ante solution to the dilemma of cryopreserved pre-embryo disposition is for
a woman to simply harvest and freeze her unfertilized eggs until they are needed in the future.
The Science of Egg Freezing, supra note 7.  Unlike an embryo, the egg is a single unfertilized egg,
belonging solely to the woman who produced it. Id. Because the eggs belong to only one per-
son, as opposed to being the product of two progenitors, only one person will have ownership
and decisional authority over the eggs, making disposition significantly less complicated. See
Joke I. De Witte & Henk Ten Have, Ownership of Genetic Material and Information, 45 SOC.
SCI. MED. 51, 58 (1997) (“Assuming the right of self-ownership of the body, genetic material is
the property of the person from whom the material was taken.”); see also Seth Axlerad, Survey
of State DNA Database Statutes, AM. SOC’Y OF LAW, MED. & ETHICS (Nov. 2, 2010), https://
www.aslme.org/dna_04/reports/axelrad4.pdf (noting that four states—Alaska, Colorado, Florida,
and Georgia—statutorily declare genetic information to be the personal property of the individ-
ual to which it pertains).
12. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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vides for two of the three dominant approaches13 to resolving pre-
embryo disposition cases, the contract approach and the balancing of
interests approach;14 and second, it introduces the often-quoted con-
cept that pre-embryos “are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or
‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life.”15
Since the Tennessee Supreme Court decided Davis, only five other
state supreme courts have confronted the issue of how to deal with
disputes over the disposition of frozen pre-embryos.16  From these six
state supreme court decisions, three analytical frameworks to resolv-
ing pre-embryo disposition disputes have emerged: the contract ap-
proach, the balancing of interests approach, and the contemporaneous
mutual consent approach.17  Underpinning the latter two approaches
is the principle that courts will not “force” a party to procreate if he
changes his mind regarding use of the pre-embryos.18
Disputes in the field of reproductive technologies and services are
not amenable to neat judicial resolution due to the complexity of IVF
technology and the transactions governing embryonic disposition.19  A
first complicating factor is that the legal status of the embryo is uncer-
tain.20  The pre-embryo is neither “person nor property,” but rather
occupies an indeterminate “interim category.”21  Second, the
processes of IVF and disposition of embryos are not wholly commer-
cial, though they contain commercial elements.  For instance, the IVF
clinics provide a commercial service for couples; for the couples them-
13. The third approach is contemporaneous mutual consent, discussed infra notes 156–172
and accompanying text.
14. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598, 603.
15. Id. at 597.
16. Rubin & Lourgos, supra note 1.
17. Flannery, supra note 10, at 233.
18. See infra notes 79–107 and accompanying text.  The decision to use male pronouns to
reference a party wishing to withdraw use of pre-embryos comports with the general trend in the
case law that the man is typically the party wishing to withdraw.  Roy Strom, Who Do They
Belong To?, CHI. LAW., Sept. 2014, at 36, 38, available at http://www.sdflaw.com/files/who_do_
they_belong_to.pdf.  However, it can, and has in fact gone, in the opposite direction in the past—
with the woman wishing to withdraw use of the pre-embryos and the man seeking to have the
pre-embryos develop. Id.
19. See generally ERIK PARENS & LORI P. KNOWLES, HASTINGS CTR., REPROGENETICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY: REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2003), available at http://www.thehast
ingscenter.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Special_Reports/reprogenetics_and_public_policy.pdf.
20. Cynthia S. Marietta, Frozen Embryo Litigation Spotlights Pressing Questions: What Is the
Legal Status of an Embryo and Can It Be Adopted?, HEALTH L. PERSP., Apr. 2010, at 1, 4–5,
available at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2010/marietta-embryolegal.pdf.
21. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
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selves, the process is primarily personal.22  Commercial and noncom-
mercial relationships are necessarily different and are often treated
differently by the courts.  Third, reproduction implicates fundamental
aspects of an individual’s personality; whether or not to have a child
goes directly to the core of a person’s being.23  Thus, when parties
disagree over the use of embryos, the interests at stake are primarily
deeply personal, emotional interests, which are intangible and impos-
sible to quantify.
The current jurisprudence on embryonic disposition illustrates the
tensions in the issues discussed above.  Although developed in only a
handful of states so far, the law that has emerged is disjointed and
inconsistent, reflecting the legal system’s failure to grapple with these
issues coherently.24  Furthermore, none of the three approaches offer
an ideal solution because all three have serious problems.  However,
of the three approaches, the contract approach works best because it
provides predictability to the parties, fosters consistency in the law,
and encourages party autonomy.25  This Comment, which will use Illi-
nois as its jurisdictional focus, contends that although the contract ap-
proach is the best of the three analytical frameworks, the better and
simpler solution is to treat the creation of IVF pre-embryos the same
as “naturally” conceived pre-embryos by giving full and exclusive de-
cision-making powers to the mother.26
This Comment additionally seeks to problematize the public policy
argument against “forced procreation,” which would likely stand as a
conceptual barrier to broad judicial acceptance of treating “IVF
mothers”27 the same as “natural” mothers.  First, it suggests that the
argument that “forced procreation is not an area amenable to judicial
enforcement,”28 which tips the scale in favor of the party wishing to
avoid use of the pre-embryos, has a faulty premise—namely that
courts will not compel an individual to become a parent.29  The asser-
22. See Kasey Edwards, Is Low Cost IVF Worth the Price?, DAILYLIFE (June 14, 2013, 7:54
AM), http://www.dailylife.com.au/life-and-love/parenting-and-families/is-low-cost-ivf-worth-the-
price-20130613-2o5q8.html.
23. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 30 (1994).
24. See Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and Pro-
posed State Regulation, HUM. LIFE REV. (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.humanlifereview.com/the-
frozen-embryo-scholarly-theories-case-law-and-proposed-state-regulation/.
25. Flannery, supra note 10, at 275.
26. See infra notes 130–219 and accompanying text.
27. The term “IVF mother” refers to a woman who has conceived a pre-embryo through IVF.
The term “natural” mother refers to a woman who has conceived through sexual intercourse.
28. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000).
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
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tion breaks down when analyzed against the backdrop of abortion ju-
risprudence, which gives complete and independent decisional
authority to the woman.
Second, because the jurisprudence on abortion, Roe v. Wade,30
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,31 and Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth,32 has defined the rights and interests involved in natural
pregnancies and has deemed it appropriate to give full decisional au-
thority to the woman, this Comment suggests that this is a good start-
ing point from which to begin defining the rights and interests within
the IVF context as well.  This Comment suggests that exclusive deci-
sional authority over IVF pre-embryos should likewise rest with the
woman.33
Part II of this Comment gives an overview of the three dominant
approaches to resolving pre-embryo custody disputes.34  It describes
the decisions and reasoning of the six state supreme courts that have
considered the issue of cryopreserved pre-embryo disposition.35  Part
III engages in a critical analysis of the three approaches: the contract
approach, the balancing of interests approach, and the contemporane-
ous mutual consent approach.36  Then, it engages in an analysis of the
argument against “forced procreation,” and argues that giving the
mother full decisional authority over the pre-embryos is the simplest,
fairest, and most logical way to deal with pre-embryo custody dis-
putes.37  Part IV analyzes the impact of disregarding the three judi-
cially created pre-embryo disposition doctrines for the simpler model
suggested in this Comment.38
II. BACKGROUND
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Tennessee became the first high
court to address the issue of cryopreserved pre-embryo disposition in
the event that the progenitors could not agree.39  In Davis, a then-
married couple stored seven pre-embryos in a fertility clinic.40  After
30. 410 U.S. 113.
31. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
32. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
33. Although contracts will undoubtedly be useful and necessary in particular situations (e.g.,
when a third-party egg donor is involved or to govern disputes between the parents and the IVF
clinic), that discussion is outside the scope of this article.
34. See infra notes 39–135 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 41–109 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 136–196 and accompanying test.
37. See infra notes 197–237 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 220–232 and accompanying text.
39. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992).
40. Id.
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their divorce, the couple could not agree about who would retain con-
trol of the frozen pre-embryos.41  The wife sought control of the pre-
embryos for potential implantation in the future, but the husband ar-
gued that he did not want to father a child “outside the bounds of
marriage.”42  The Davises did not previously enter into a written
agreement specifying a course of action relating to the unused frozen
pre-embryos in the event of a dispute, nor was there a state statute
governing the issue.43
The trial court concluded that the pre-embryos were “children in
vitro” and invoked the doctrine of parens patriae,44 reasoning that it
was in the best interest of the “child” to be born rather than de-
stroyed.  However, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that pre-
embryos did not have the legal status of “person” or “property,” but
rather occupied an “interim category.”45 The court held that an agree-
ment regarding the disposition of frozen pre-embryos in the event of
contingencies should be presumed valid and should be enforced be-
tween the progenitors.46  In the Davis case, however, because the par-
ties did not have a prior agreement governing the fate of the pre-
embryos, the court balanced the their respective constitutional inter-
ests—the right to procreate versus the right to avoid procreation.47
The court held that the interests of the party wishing to avoid pro-
creation should ordinarily prevail, assuming that the other party has a
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 590.
44. Id. at 594. Parens patriae is Latin for “parent of his or her country.” Parens patriae,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (10th ed. 2014).  The doctrine refers to the power of the state to
act as guardian for those who are unable to care for themselves, such as children or disabled
individuals. Id. For example, a judge may change custody, child support, or other rulings affect-
ing a child’s well-being, regardless of what the parents may have agreed to. Id.
45. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.  Although courts’ approaches to resolving embryo disputes do
not specifically focus on defining the legal status of the pre-embryo, the parties to the disputes
frequently make arguments concerning how courts ought to perceive the legal status of the pre-
embryo.  Kimberly Berg, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
506, 511 (2006).  Furthermore, a state’s understanding and treatment of frozen pre-embryos is
likely to affect how it approaches the disputes. Id. There are three generally acknowledged
approaches to define the legal status of frozen pre-embryos: (1) treating the pre-embryo as a
person; (2) treating the pre-embryo as property; and (3) treating pre-embryos as occupying an
“interim” position, as the Tennessee Court first established in Davis, the most common ap-
proach. Id. Louisiana is the only state to formally adopt the position that a pre-embryo is a
person, characterizing it as a “juridical person” and a “biological human being.” Id.  It is argued,
however, that this approach is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s statements in Roe that “the
unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.” Id.  An Alabama
court, in Cahill v. Cahill, referred to the progenitor as an “owner” and the embryos as “prop-
erty.” Id. (citing Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d 465, 467 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)).
46. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
47. Id. at 603.
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reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by other means.48  If
no reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument to use the pre-
embryos to achieve parenthood should be considered.49  The court af-
firmed the appellate court’s reversal of the trial court’s decision to
award the pre-embryos to the wife, and instructed that the fertility
treatment facility was free to follow its normal procedures in disposing
the unused pre-embryos.50
The Tennessee Supreme Court introduced two out of the three ap-
proaches to resolving pre-embryo custody disputes: the contract ap-
proach and the balancing of interests approach.  This Part details the
case law developed after Davis, explaining the contract, balancing of
interests, and contemporaneous mutual consent approaches to resolv-
ing pre-embryo custody disputes.  This Part ends with an in-depth
look at how the pre-embryo disposition dispute has resurfaced in Illi-
nois in Szanfranski.
A. The Contract Approach
Under the contract approach, a court enforces, subject to evaluation
against well-settled principles of contract law, any prior agreement be-
tween the parties.51  However, some courts following the contract ap-
proach have adopted a “change of mind” exception, in which the
court will follow a contract approach generally but refuse, out of con-
siderations for public policy, to enforce an otherwise valid contract
when one party has changed his mind regarding his desire to become a
parent.52
Six years after the Davis decision, the New York Court of Appeals,
in Kass v. Kass,53 became the second state high court to consider the
pre-embryo disposition issue.54  The facts in Kass are very similar to
those in Davis—a couple created and preserved five pre-embryos dur-
ing their marriage, which were to assist the couple in having a child.55
The couple later divorced and disagreed over the disposition of the
frozen pre-embryos.56  The wife wanted to have the pre-embryos im-
48. Id. at 604.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 604–05.
51. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179–80 (N.Y. 1998); see also Litowitz v. Litowitz (In re
Marriage of Litowitz), 48 P.3d 261, 267 (Wash. 2002).
52. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001); see also In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d
782 (Iowa 2003).
53. 696 N.E.2d 174.
54. Id. at 178.
55. Id. at 175.
56. Id. at 177.
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planted, claiming it was her only chance for genetic motherhood.57
The husband, opposed to the burdens of unwanted fatherhood, de-
sired to donate the pre-embryos to the IVF clinic for research in ac-
cordance with the informed consent agreement the couple had signed
at the hospital.58
The trial court awarded control of the pre-embryos to the wife,
holding that a female participant in the IVF procedure has exclusive
decisional authority over the fertilized eggs created through that pro-
cess, just as a pregnant woman has exclusive decisional authority over
her nonviable fetus.59  The appellate court reversed, finding (1) that a
woman’s right to privacy and bodily integrity are not implicated
before implantation occurs; and (2) that when parties to an IVF pro-
cedure have themselves determined the disposition of any unused fer-
tilized eggs, their agreement should control.60  The court split,
however, on the issue of whether the hospital consent agreements
were sufficiently clear to control the disposition of the pre-embryos
and remanded the case back to the trial court.61
Applying a strict contract approach, the high court of New York
found that the parties had clearly expressed their intent to donate
their eggs to the clinic in the event of their inability to agree, and that
such prior agreements between progenitors should be presumed valid
and binding.62  The court reasoned that parties should be encouraged
in advance to think through the possible contingencies and carefully
specify their wishes in writing because explicit agreements avoid costly
litigation, minimize misunderstandings, maximize procreative liberty,
and provide the certainty needed for effective operation of IVF
programs.63
Washington also favors a strict contract approach. In re Litowitz,64
which came before the Washington Supreme Court in 2002, concerned
the disposition of two cryopreserved pre-embryos made from the hus-
band’s sperm and a donor’s eggs, upon dissolution of the couple’s
marriage.65  The couple had entered into a written agreement with the
egg donor, which gave the wife the legal status of intended parent of
57. Id. at 175.
58. Id.
59. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 180.
63. Id.
64. Litowitz v. Litowitz (In re Marriage of Litowitz), 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
65. Id. at 262–64.
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the pre-embryos.66  The Supreme Court of Washington held that
under this contract, the wife has the same contractual rights to the
eggs as the husband, who was the biological father.67  The couple had
also entered into two written agreements with the fertility clinic.68
The first was a consent and authorization contract for pre-embryo cry-
opreservation following in vitro fertilization, which provided for the
freezing of the pre-embryos.69  The second was an agreement and con-
sent for cryogenic preservation.70
The consent and authorization for pre-embryo cryopreservation
contract stated in pertinent part that
any decision regarding the disposition of our pre-embryos will be
made by mutual consent.  In the event we are unable to reach a
mutual decision regarding the disposition of our pre-embryos, we
must petition to a Court of competent jurisdiction for instructions
concerning the appropriate disposition of our pre-embryos.71
This same contract also indicated that the couple’s desired method of
disposition was to allow their pre-embryos to be thawed out but pre-
vented from undergoing further development, and they instructed the
clinic to pursue this method of disposition if the pre-embryos were not
used within five years after the date of freezing.72
After the couple’s divorce, they were unable to reach an agreement
regarding the pre-embryos—the husband desired to put the pre-em-
bryos up for adoption, whereas the wife desired to have the remaining
pre-embryos implanted in a surrogate mother and brought to term.73
The trial court awarded custody of the two frozen pre-embryos to the
husband based upon “the best interest of the child,” and the court of
appeals affirmed.74  The court of appeals further reasoned that the
husband’s right not to procreate compelled the court to award the pre-
embryos to him.75
66. Id. at 268.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 263.
69. Id.
70. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 263.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 264.
73. Id. Although the egg donor contract provided that “[i]n no event may the Intended Par-
ents allow any other party the use of said eggs without express written permission of the Egg
Donor,” the court did not find this clause applicable to the husband’s desire to put the pre-
embryos up for adoption, because the egg donor agreement referred only to the donor’s eggs,
not the fertilized pre-embryo, which the court considered transformed and distinct from her
unfertilized eggs. Id. at 267.
74. Id. at 264–65.
75. Id. at 265.
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The Supreme Court of Washington, relying solely on the contrac-
tual rights of the parties under the pre-embryo cryopreservation con-
tract with the clinic, found that the couple had agreed to submit to the
court the question of disposition of the remaining pre-embryos in the
event they could not reach a mutual decision.76  The court then held
that under this agreement, the pre-embryos would have been thawed
out and not allowed to undergo further development five years after
the initial date of cryopreservation, which had already passed by the
time the case was brought to the court.77  The court noted that the
record did not indicate whether the pre-embryos were still in exis-
tence at that time, but it nonetheless reversed the decision of the court
of appeals.78
B. The Balancing of Interests Approach
In instances when a court has found that no contract exists, ren-
dered the contract unenforceable, or has rejected the contract ap-
proach altogether, some courts adopt the balancing of interests
approach.  Under this approach, courts consider the viewpoints and
arguments of the parties, the significance of their interests, and the
relative burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions.79
Courts that have employed this approach have primarily favored the
interest of the party desiring to withdraw consent to use the pre-em-
bryos, reasoning that strong public policy and constitutional consider-
ations implicating liberty and privacy come out in favor against forced,
or compelled, procreation.80
A.Z. v. B.Z.,81 decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
2000, also involves the disposition of frozen pre-embryos after a
couple’s divorce and subsequent disagreement over their use.82  Here,
the couple had signed a series of consent forms that specified that
control of the frozen pre-embryos would go to the wife in the event of
a divorce or disagreement.83  However, each time the couple was re-
quired to submit a consent form to the hospital, the husband merely
signed a blank form and the wife filled in the details afterwards.84
76. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 271.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992); see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051,
1058–59 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 716–17 (N.J. 2001).
80. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603; see also A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059; J.B., 783 A.2d at 716.
81. 725 N.E.2d 1051.
82. Id. at 1052.
83. Id. at 1053–54.
84. Id. at 1054.
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The probate and family court entered a permanent injunction in
favor of the husband, prohibiting the wife from utilizing the pre-em-
bryos.85  The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed, finding that
the consent forms were insufficient to act as a binding agreement.86
Furthermore, the court held that even if the consent agreements were
unambiguous, it would nonetheless refuse to enforce an agreement
that would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her
will.87  The court reasoned that, as a matter of public policy, forced
procreation is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement, and that
courts will not enforce contracts that violate public policy.88
In its 2001 decision J.B. v. M.B,89 the New Jersey Supreme Court
opted for a contract approach subject to the “change of mind” excep-
tion.90  In this post-divorce control battle over cryopreserved pre-em-
bryos, the wife sought the destruction of the pre-embryos, while the
husband sought to donate the pre-embryos to another couple for im-
plantation.91  The New Jersey Supreme Court held that it would en-
force agreements entered into at the time IVF began, subject to the
right of either party to change his or her mind about disposition up to
the point of use or destruction.92  When one party reconsidered his or
her earlier decision to become a parent, the court concluded it would
85. Id. at 1052.
86. Id. at 1057–58.  Among the reasons the court found the consent forms insufficient were (1)
the consent form’s primary purpose was to explain to the donors the benefits and risks of freez-
ing, and to record the donors’ desires for disposition of the frozen pre-embryos at the time the
form is executed in order to provide the clinic with guidance if the donors (as a unit) no longer
wish to use the frozen pre-embryos; (2) the consent form did not contain a duration provision,
and that absent any evidence that the donors agreed on a time period during which the consent
form was to govern, the court would not assume that time period; (3) the form uses the term
“become separated” without defining it; and (4) the consent form was not a separation agree-
ment that is binding on the couple in a court proceeding pursuant to state statute. Id. at
1056–57.
87. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057.
88. Id. at 1057–58.  The court here analyzed both the state legislature’s intent and past judicial
decisions that concerned prior agreements to enter into familial relationships to conclude that
compelling an individual to enter into intimate family relationships violated public policy. Id. at
1058.  The court looked at a state statute that abolished a cause of action for breach of a promise
to marry. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 47A (2000)).  It also looked at a statute in
which “the Legislature provided that no mother may agree to surrender her child ‘sooner than
the fourth calendar day after the date of birth of the child to be adopted’ regardless of any prior
agreement.” Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 47A (2000)).  The court then cited its own
precedent that it would “not order either a husband or wife to do what is necessary to conceive a
child or prevent conception, any more than [it] would order either party to do what is necessary
to make the other happy.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Mass. 1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
89. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
90. Id. at 718–21.
91. Id. at 710.
92. Id. at 719.
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then employ a balancing of interests approach, weighing the respec-
tive interests and burdens of the parties against one another.93
The court noted that ordinarily, the party desiring not to become a
biological parent would prevail.94  However, it expressed no opinion
with respect to a situation in which a party who has become infertile
seeks use of stored pre-embryos against the wishes of his or her part-
ner, though it noted that the possibility for adoption may be consid-
ered by a court.95  Here, the court found that the husband was already
a father, was capable of fathering additional children, and that his in-
terest in donating the pre-embryos did not outweigh the wife’s interest
against forced genetic parenthood.96
C. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach
Finally, under the contemporaneous mutual consent approach, a
court enforces the status quo97 until the parties mutually agree on a
course of disposition.98  If the donors are unable to reach a mutual
decision on the disposition of the pre-embryos, then no transfer, re-
lease, destruction, or use of the pre-embryos can occur.99  As in the
balancing of interests approach, the conclusion that “forced procrea-
93. Id. at 719–20.
94. Id. at 716.
95. J.B., 783 A.2d at 720.
96. Id.
[The husband’s] right to procreate is not lost if he is denied an opportunity to use or
donate the pre-embryos. . . .  [However, the wife’s] right not to procreate may be lost
through attempted use or through donation of the preembryos. Implantation if success-
ful, would result in the birth of her biological child and could have life-long emotional
and psychological repercussions.
Id. at 717.  Reports suggest that even children born from anonymous sperm donors are now able
to easily track down their birth fathers through DNA testing technology. See, e.g., Rachel Leh-
mann-Haupt, Are Sperm Donors Really Anonymous Anymore?, SLATE (Mar. 1, 2010), http://
www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2010/02/are_sperm_donors_really_anonymous_any
more.html.  In fact, a fifteen-year-old boy was able to track down his genetic father using nothing
but a swab test and the internet. Boy Tracks His Sperm Donor Father, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2,
2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4400778.stm. See generally Craig Malisow, Donor Babies
Search for Their Anonymous Fathers, HOUS. PRESS (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.houstonpress
.com/2008-11-06/news/donor-babies-search-for-their-anonymous-fathers/2/.  The ease with which
a genetic parent might be tracked down in the future by their biological children may lend sup-
port to the court’s proposition that allowing pre-embryos to be used against a parent’s wishes
could lead to “life-long emotional and psychological repercussions.” J.B., 783 N.E.2d at 717.
97. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003) (“The practical effect will be
that the embryos are stored indefinitely unless both parties can agree to destroy the fertilized
eggs.”).
98. Id. at 778.
99. Id. at 783.
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tion is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement” underlies the
contemporaneous mutual consent model.100
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Iowa considered the issue of how to
deal with the disposition of a couple’s frozen pre-embryos after the
dissolution of their marriage and their subsequent inability to reach an
accord.101  The court found that it was bad public policy102 to enforce
a prior agreement between the parties if one of the parties had
changed his or her mind concerning the use of the pre-embryos.103
The court here concluded that in the event of a party’s change of
mind, a contemporaneous mutual consent model would be best be-
cause it shares an underlying premise with the contract model.104  This
underlying premise is that decisions about the disposition of frozen
pre-embryos belong to the couple that created them, with each part-
ner entitled to an equal say in how the pre-embryos should be dis-
posed.105  Therefore, if donors are unable to reach a mutual decision
on disposition, then no transfer, release, disposition, or use of the pre-
embryos can occur without the signed authorization of both donors,
and the party who opposes destruction is responsible for any storage
fees.106  The court was interested in preserving party autonomy on is-
sues that implicate deeply personal and private matters, such as family
planning.107
D. The Pre-Embryo Disposition Issue Surfaces in Illinois
This Part explores the pre-embryo disposition issue as developed in
Illinois through the Szafranski case.  This Part gives the relevant facts
of Szafranski, discusses the procedural posture of the case, and sum-
marizes the rule of law in Illinois as decided by the Illinois appellate
court in 2013.
100. Id. at 778 (quoting A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–58 (Mass. 2000)).
101. Id. at 771–72.
102. “The term ‘public policy’ is of indefinite and uncertain definition . . . . [H]owever, it may
be said that any contract which conflicts with the morals of the times or contravenes any estab-
lished interest of society is contrary to public policy.” Id. at 779–80 (quoting Liggett v. Shriver,
164 N.W. 611, 612 (Iowa 1917)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781.
104. Id. at 777.
105. Id. (quoting Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An In-
alienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 81 (1999)).
106. Id. at 783.
107. Id. at 781.
Proponents of the mutual-consent approach suggest that, with respect to “decisions
about intensely emotional matters, where people act more on the basis of feeling and
instinct than rational deliberation,” it may “be impossible to make a knowing and intel-
ligent decision to relinquish a right in advance of the time the right is to be exercised.”
Id. at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 105, at 98).
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In March 2010, Karla and Jacob signed a document entitled “In-
formed Consent for Assisted Reproduction.”108  The consent form
stated in pertinent part that
no use can be made of the embryos without the consent of both
partners (if applicable). . . .  In the event of . . . dissolution of the . . .
partnership, [Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation’s Division
of Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility] will abide by the
terms of the court decree or settlement agreement regarding the
ownership and/or other rights to the embryos.109
The couple also met with an attorney that day to discuss the legal
implications of creating pre-embryos; the attorney presented them
with two possible agreements: a sperm donor agreement and a
coparenting agreement.110
The couple opted for the coparenting agreement, and on March 29,
2010, the attorney sent the couple a draft, the stated purpose of which
was to “memorialize the Parties’ intent and agreement that they shall
both be established as the legal coparents of the Child.”111  The co-
parent agreement also provided that any cryopreserved pre-embryos
shall be “under Karla’s sole control,” and that “Jacob acknowledges
and agrees that Karla is likely to be unable to create new healthy em-
bryos subsequent to the chemotherapy regiment [sic] she will un-
dergo, and Jacob specifically agrees that Karla should have the
opportunity to use such embryos to have a child.”112  The couple
never signed the coparenting agreement.113  Yet on April 6, 2010,
Szafranski deposited sperm, and eight eggs were retrieved from Dun-
ston.114  The couple agreed to fertilize all eight eggs, but only three of
the pre-embryos ultimately survived to viability.115  On April 7, Dun-
ston began her chemotherapy treatment, which did ultimately render
her infertile.116  In May 2010, Szafranski ended his relationship with
Dunston.117
On August 22, 2011, Szafranski filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court of Cook County seeking to permanently enjoin Dunston from
108. Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 503–04 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
109. Id. at 504.
110. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 504.
111. Id. By statute in Illinois, a donor who provides sperm to a licensed physician for use in
artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife will be treated by law “as if he
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3 (2012).




116. Id.; see also Strom, supra note 18, at 36.
117. Szfranski, 993 N.E.2d at 504.
2015]THE “FORCE” BEHIND “FORCED PROCREATION” 751
using the pre-embryos in order to “preserve his right not to forcibly
father a child against his will.”118  Dunston responded on September
1, 2011, with a three-count counterclaim (1) seeking a declaratory
judgment granting her sole custody; (2) alleging breach of contract
and requesting specific performance of the parties’ agreement; and (3)
seeking relief under the theory of promissory estoppel.119  At the close
of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.120
On September 17, 2012, the trial court granted Dunston’s motion for
summary judgment, relying on the balancing of interests approach.121
The appellate court of Illinois, however, decided that the appropriate
test to apply is the contract approach and vacated the entry of sum-
mary judgment.122  However, the court also held that the lower court
should employ the balance-of-interests approach in cases where no
contract exists and noted that a special interest exists when the em-
bryos in dispute represent the last chance to procreate for one of the
parties.123
Because the parties were unable to present evidence in support of
their respective viewpoints and arguments in light of the contract, the
appellate court remanded the matter back to the trial court to apply
the contract approach to any facts previously presented and to any
facts the parties wanted to present on remand.124  The parties ap-
pealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, but that court denied a petition
to hear arguments on the case.125  On remand, the trial court ruled
again in Karla’s favor, holding that she and Jacob created an oral con-
tract in March when Karla asked Jacob to donate his sperm, which
118. Id. at 504–05.
119. Id. at 505.
120. Id.
121. Id.  The court was persuaded by the legal arguments made in Dunston’s brief. Id. at 506.
The arguments in Dunston’s brief were that (1) Szafranski was bound by the coparent agreement
because, although he did not sign it, he fully performed the critical obligation under the agree-
ment and provided sperm to create the pre-embryos; (2) he induced her to rely on his represen-
tation that he would help her have her own children, and she was harmed by that reliance
because she cannot go back and use a random sperm donor to fertilize her eggs; and (3) even if
the court found that Szafranski was not bound by the coparent agreement or estopped from
preventing use of the pre-embryos, the court should follow precedent and balance the interests
of the parties, finding that Dunston’s interest in having her own biological children outweighs
Szafranksi’s interest in not fathering a child. Id. at 505.
122. Id. at 517.
123. Strom, supra note 18, at 38.
124. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 517–18.
125. Andrew Maloney, Pre-Embryo Case Denied by Top Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 4,
2013, at 1, 22.  Because the Illinois Supreme Court declined to weigh in on the pre-embryo
disposition issue, the decision of the Illinois appellate court to apply the contract approach, and
the balancing of interests approach in the absence of a contract, stands as the applicable law on
pre-embryo disposition disputes in the state.
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Jacob later followed by providing.126  Jacob appealed this second rul-
ing, and the Illinois appellate court heard oral arguments for the case,
though no decision has yet been handed down.127  If the appellate
court affirms the trial court, Jacob’s attorney will appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court, asking it to address his constitutional argument that
he should not be forced into fatherhood.128  Eventually, that question
could also be posed to the U.S. Supreme Court.129  Therefore, as it
stands in Illinois, the rule is that a court should apply the contract
approach if an agreement between the parties exists and should bal-
ance the parties’ interests in the absence of an agreement.
II. ANALYSIS
This Part (1) analyzes the pros and cons of the contract, balancing
of interests, and contemporaneous mutual consent approaches; (2)
concludes that none of the approaches are viable because each ap-
proach is prohibitively complex; and (3) suggests that the proper solu-
tion is to give women who conceive pre-embryos through IVF the
same rights afforded to women who conceive through intercourse
(i.e., “naturally”).
A. The Pros and Cons of the Three Approaches
A majority of the state supreme courts to decide pre-embryo cus-
tody disputes have endorsed some variation of the contract ap-
proach.130  However, the method for resolving these disputes is far
from settled.131  The balancing of interests and contemporaneous mu-
tual consent approaches survive as seemingly legitimate options as
well.  However, when teasing out the pros and cons of the three ap-
126. Strom, supra note 18, at 41.  On remand, Judge Hall held,
The agreement represents the intent of the parties, at the time, that Karla need not
obtain Jacob’s consent to attempt to have a child. . . .
The judge noted that neither Dunston nor Szafranski intended the relationship to
last, and that Szafranski did not place any conditions on future use at the time Dun-
ston’s eggs were harvested and fertilized. The informed consent was not a legal agree-
ment between the couple, [the judge] held. The co-parent agreement, never signed,
didn’t carry enough weight.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Kim Bellware, Her Last Chance for a Baby. His Fight Against Forced Fatherhood. The
Court Must Decide, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/
22/illinois-frozen-embryo_n_6348920.html.
128. Strom, supra note 18, at 42.
129. Id.
130. See discussion supra notes 39–107 and accompanying text.
131. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model
for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 392, 442 (2013).
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proaches, it becomes obvious that the best approach is actually to dis-
regard these complicated analytical frameworks for a simpler solution.
1. The Contract Approach
Under a contract model to pre-embryo custody dispute resolution, a
court enforces any prior agreements between the parties, subject to
evaluation against well-settled principles of contract law.132  The likely
benefits of following a contract approach are more numerous than the
balancing of interests or contemporaneous mutual consent models.133
For one, it provides predictability and encourages party autonomy.134
Parties mutually agree to the terms that will govern their rights and
responsibilities.135  This is inherently fairer than a judicially imposed
determination because the parties are free to decide the terms based
on an understanding of their own interests.136  Because agreed-upon
terms exist to govern the process, parties will be more certain of the
outcome should the disagreement reach the courts.
Following a contract approach also promotes judicial efficiency.137
First, parties are less likely to choose costly litigation when the out-
come of the dispute is clear.138  Second, because many of the princi-
ples of contract law are well settled, the courts have the necessary
experience to expeditiously resolve disputes that are brought to
132. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
133. Although this Comment advocates giving the woman full decisional authority over IVF
pre-embryos in a manner that is consistent with natural pregnancies, contracts still have a role to
play in certain IVF situations.  For instance, an agreement with the clinic governing disposition
may still be necessary so that the clinic knows how long to keep the pre-embryos in storage and
how to dispose of them when that time period has passed.  Furthermore, a situation in which a
third party donates eggs or sperm, an agreement is likely necessary to define the rights (or lack
thereof) of the third party in relation to the intended parent or parents.
134. Flannery, supra note 10, at 275.
135. “A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the
parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent.”  Hotchkiss v.
Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 18 (1981) (“Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each
party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.”); Lawrence M. Solan, Contract
as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 358–59 (2007).
136. Oliver Hart, Making the Case for Contract Theory (2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1889201.
137. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 23, at 418 (“Surely enforcement of prior agreements for
disposition of embryos is less likely to generate litigation and more likely to resolve it efficiently
when it does arise.”).
138. Patrick D. Keating, Sec. of Litig. Comm. on Corp. Counsel, A.B.A., Seminar: Minimizing
the Risks of Litigation by Contract (Feb. 12–15, 2009), available at http://www.haynesboone.com/
files/Publication/6a85cbf1-bf98-42e4-a5bf-c388d3c42a8b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/00
b015ab-f4a6-4c17-a5a3-293e31abf30a/Minimizing_Risks-Litigation_by_Contract.pdf.
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court.139  Finally, requiring parties undergoing IVF to contract for
their interests could encourage them to think more carefully through
contingencies and therefore to plan for these contingencies through
the terms of their agreement.140
However, the contract approach is not without its problems.  One
negative aspect of the contract approach is that that there are less
opportunities for the parties to make autonomous decisions on contin-
gencies not contemplated in the agreement.141  A second problem is
that a court may create “moral harm” when it compels an individual
to abide by a contract that requires him to become a parent after he
has changed his mind.142  This is a difficult criticism to contend with.
Legal scholar Anthony Kronman notes, “When the promisor’s own
values have changed dramatically, the compulsory performance of a
contract requiring his personal cooperation with the other party may
pose a special threat to his integrity or self-respect.”143  Finally, con-
tracts can be costly because parties have to hire attorneys and spend
time constructing and negotiating the terms of the agreement.
2. The Balancing of Interests Approach
Under the balancing of interests approach, a court will consider the
position of the parties, the significance of their interests, and the rela-
tive burdens that would be imposed by differing resolutions.144  The
greatest advantage of this approach is that it allows the courts to effec-
tively integrate public policy into their decisions.145  Another advan-
139. See Marisa G. Zizzi, Comment, The Preembryo Prenup: A Proposed Pennsylvania Statute
Adopting a Contractual Approach To Resolving Disputes Concerning the Disposition of Frozen
Embryos, 21 WIDENER L.J. 391, 414 (2002) (“[A]dvanced dispositional agreements . . . set forth
a sound legal framework under which disputes between donors can be analyzed—a contractual
framework.”).
140. Diane K. Yang, Comment, What’s Mine Is Mine, but What’s Yours Should Also Be Mine:
An Analysis of State Statutes That Mandate the Implantation of Frozen Preembryos, 10 J.L. &
POL’Y 587, 627 (2002) (“Divorce, death of the participants, and the possibility of future infertility
are all conceivable situations, and the effect of these events can be provided for in a written
agreement.  Contracting encourages potential parents to consider these possibilities and decide
disposition issues prior to creating preembryos or dissolving the relationship.”); see also Noel A.
Fleming, Comment, Navigating the Slippery Slope of Frozen Embryo Disputes: The Case for a
Contractual Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 345, 372 (2002) (“The process of executing a contrac-
tual agreement to regulate future control of frozen embryos may also have the added benefit of
causing the parties to pause, think, and recognize the importance of the commitment into which
they are about to enter.”).
141. See Anthony Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 780–82
(1983).
142. See id. at 783.
143. Id.
144. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
145. Flannery, supra note 10, at 276.
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tage of the general theory is that cost–benefit analyses produces
optimal results.146  This is because after the benefits and costs associ-
ated with particular outcomes are weighed against one another, the
outcome with more benefits wins, resulting in a general minimization
of costs and a maximization of benefits.147
However, cost–benefit analyses are arguably more appropriate
where the factors to be weighed are tangible and objectively quantifi-
able, as when the issue to be considered is wholly economic.148  Within
the context of pre-embryo custody disputes, a court must weigh intan-
gible personal interests, which requires a court to subjectively quantify
the costs and benefits of its decision on each of the parties.149  Quanti-
fying the emotional harm associated with the inability of carrying a
child to term versus the emotional harm of unwanted genetic
parenthood is not only an impossible task, but also one not prudently
undertaken by a purportedly neutral judicial system.150  The balancing
of interests approach leaves far too much room for a judge’s own nor-
mative values to color her decision making.151
Furthermore, this approach would require burdensome ad hoc liti-
gation.152  Every new dispute would need to be litigated based on the
specific facts of each case, and then the facts of each case weighed
using a subjective analysis.153  This approach is therefore the most sus-
ceptible of the three to producing widely inconsistent and unpredict-
146. Paul R. Portney, Benefit–Cost Analysis, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (2008), http://www.econ
lib.org/library/Enc/BenefitCostAnalysis.html.
147. Kimberly Berg, Note, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 506, 515 (2006) (arguing that a balancing test yields outcomes best tailored to the
circumstances).
148. See Portney, supra note 146 (“To ascertain the net effect of a proposed policy change on
social well-being, we must first have a way of measuring the gains to the gainers and the losses to
the losers.”).
149. Cf. Fleming, supra note 140, at 372 (“[I]n the absence of such an agreement, decision-
making authority will often be placed in the hands of a third party such as a court or the legisla-
ture.”); see also Yang, supra note 140, at 627 (discussing the risk that, when forced to grapple
with parties’ beliefs and values, courts may impose an outcome neither party ever contem-
plated); Zizzi, supra note 139, at 414.
150.
We are also committed to the idea that the legal order should remain neutral among
these conceptions [of the good], not favoring some or disfavoring others on the grounds
of their intrinsic merit.  Whenever the law invalidates a class of agreements for reasons
of this sort, it runs counter to the liberal ideal of a legal order that does not discriminate
among conceptions of the good.
Kronman, supra note 141, at 795.
151. See Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: Erasing Women’s Experiences
from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 285, 310–11 (2005).
152. Flannery, supra note 10, at 276.
153. Id. at 266.
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able outcomes.154  The balancing of interests approach also
significantly deprives parties of their autonomy in reaching decisions
relating to parenthood, a fundamental aspect of their lives and person-
alities, and therefore runs the risk of being overly paternalistic.155  The
inefficiency, subjectivity, and paternalism of the balancing of interests
approach are anathema to the American court system.
3. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach
Courts employing the contemporaneous mutual consent model up-
hold the status quo in the face of a party disagreement.156  This means
that they will not permit any transfer, release, disposition, or use of
the pre-embryos without signed authorization from both donors.157
The pre-embryos remain frozen, and the party opposing destruction is
responsible for any storage fees.158  This is the approach chosen by
Iowa, which is the only state supreme court to endorse this
approach.159
The Iowa Supreme Court elaborated on the benefits of this ap-
proach, noting that it “share[s] an underlying premise” with the con-
tract model.160  The shared premise is that the fate of the pre-embryos
is a decision that equally belongs to the parties who created them and
not to the courts.161  Based on this premise, the contemporaneous mu-
tual assent approach is seemingly ideal—parties have the autonomy to
decide the terms of disposition as agreeable to them in the present
without being restricted by inflexible contracts, which may not have
even contemplated the changed circumstances at hand.162  Further-
154. As the Court in Casey said, “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
155. See Waldman & Herald, supra note 151, at 310–23.
156. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).
157. Id.
158. Maggie Davis, Indefinite Freeze?: The Obligations a Cryopreservation Bank Has to Aban-
doned Frozen Embryos in the Wake of the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, 15 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 379, 396–97 (2012); see also Charla M. Burill, Obtaining Procrea-
tional Autonomy Through the Utilization of Default Rules in Embryo Cryopreservation Agree-
ments: Indefinite Freezing Equals an Indefinite Solution, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1365, 1386 (2008)
(explaining that the contemporaneous mutual consent model allows one parent full control to
effectively destroy the embryo).
159. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 783.
160. Id. at 777.
161. Id.
162. Coleman, supra note 105, at 102.
The difficulty of predicting one’s future feelings about cryopreserved embryos is com-
pounded by the fact that disposition decisions may not be implemented for decades
after the embryos are created.  There is simply not enough societal experience with the
practice of embryo cryopreservation to presume that most people’s decisions about the
disposition of their frozen embryos will remain stable over such long periods of time.
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more, preserving the status quo is not an irreversible decision.  It is a
type of “time-out” that the parties can use to think about and negoti-
ate for their present interests.163  On the other hand, the consequences
of a judicial determination or contract requiring either the destruction
or development of the pre-embryos into a child are both permanent
and have serious outcomes, likely resulting in emotional or financial
harm (or both) to at least one party.164  This approach also legitimizes
the role of the judicial system; by giving the parties autonomy and
equal say in arriving at their decision, it would be difficult to argue
that the decision was arbitrary, unfair, or biased.165
Although the benefits of this approach are described in terms of
mutual agreement, negotiation, and equality, its actual application
may prove to be oppressive.  For instance, if a party changes his mind
about wanting to be a parent, under this approach, all he has to do is
hold steadfast in his refusal.166  In this sense, the decision does become
permanent.  Viable reproduction has only a small window of opportu-
nity in terms of the age of the progenitors; for example, as the woman
becomes older, she is less likely to successfully carry a child to term,
and as both parties get older, they may be less physically capable of
raising a child.167  Thus, the party who has changed his mind regarding
In the absence of such experience, the law should err on the side of greater flexibility,
given the profoundly emotional nature of the issues.
Id.
163. Id. at 112 (“By preserving the status quo, it makes it possible for the partners to reach an
agreement at a later time.”).
164. Olivia Lin, Rehabilitating Bioethics: Recontextualizing In Vitro Fertilization Outside Con-
tractual Autonomy, 54 DUKE L.J. 485, 505–06 (2004) (criticizing the contract approach to IVF for
failing to account for the “realities of the relationships among the effected parties”).
165. John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 407, 415, 416 & n.30 (1990).
That decisionmaker might order dispositions different than would the gamete provider,
thus interfering more with procreative interests than would holding one to a freely
chosen future disposition.  The parties are left with less control over their procreative
interests than if they have the ability to make advance binding agreements for disposi-
tion of embryos.
Id. at 415–16; see also Waldman & Herald, supra note 151, at 289 (examining “how cognitive
biases and distortions taint medical and legal understandings of women” in the context of frozen
embryo custody disputes).
166. See Mario J. Trespalacios, Frozen Embryos: Towards an Equitable Solution, 46 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 803, 822 (1992) (“[T]he courts’ rationales work a hardship upon the party who wants to
implant the pre-embryo.”).
167. See Victoria C. Wright et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance—United
States, 2000, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 29, 2003), http://www.cdc
.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5209a1.htm; see also Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncov-
ering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021,
1055 (2004) (noting that the passage of time impairs a woman’s procreative capacity on a num-
ber of levels and at every stage of the ART process).
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the desire to become a parent may be in a more advantageous posi-
tion to secure his desired outcome.168
Not only does the refusing party have an upper hand in negotiations
due to the natural time limit on reproduction and parenting, but also
because the party seeking to prevent destruction is responsible for all
storage fees.169  Depending on this party’s financial circumstances, it
may be unduly burdensome for her to pay storage fees indefinitely.
There is also the potential for emotional or financial blackmail under
this approach, because the party that has changed his mind, as noted
above, enjoys a great bargaining advantage.170  For example, a party
may consent to use of the pre-embryos only under the condition that
the couple get back together.
Finally, this approach may produce situations that contradict the in-
ternal policies of the IVF clinic, which would create another level of
disagreement, this time between the clinic and the parties.171  For ex-
ample, it may be a clinic’s policy to dispose of stored pre-embryos
after a set number of years.  If this set number of years has passed and
the clinic is unable to reach the progenitors, the clinic might go ahead
and dispose of the pre-embryos, which would foreclose the opportu-
nity for the progenitors to reach a decision themselves.172
Based on the considerations highlighted above, the purported bene-
fits of this theory are too easily susceptible to compulsion in practice
to be a workable model for pre-embryo disposition.
Despite the benefits of the three approaches described above, this
Comment posits that the drawbacks render each approach unviable
and instead suggests that the Illinois Supreme Court, and eventually
the U.S. Supreme Court, should elect to give women who conceive
through IVF the same rights over their pre-embryos as women who
conceive naturally have over their embryos.
168. Trespalacios, supra note 166, at 823.
169. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).  For instance, one particular
fertility clinic’s storage fee is about $500 per year. Egg Freezing FAQs, USC FERTILITY (2013),
http://www.uscfertility.org/fertility-options/egg-freezing-faqs.
170. Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right To Change One’s Mind, 12 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 103 (2002) (“One party’s holdout ‘right’ not to be a parent and to dispose
of pre-embryos becomes a veto—and perhaps a bargaining chip in divorce—over the other
party’s ‘right’ to be a parent.”).
171. Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 897, 918–926 (2000) (discussing the disconnect between clinic practices and parties’ actual
desires).
172. Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Embryo Disposal Practices in IVF Clinics in the United
States, POL. & LIFE SCI., Sept. 2003, at 4, 6.  Disposal policies are not standardized between
clinics, and there is no law specifically mandating informed consent of both progenitors for dis-
posal. Id. at 4–6.  Thus, even if a court requires the parties to mutually agree, a clinic may allow
one party to dispose of the pre-embryos without the consent or knowledge of the other. Id. at 6.
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B. The Myth of “Forced Procreation” Has Unnecessarily
Complicated the Debate
The following Part analyzes and uses the U.S. Supreme Court’s
abortion jurisprudence to dismantle the logic behind the “forced pro-
creation”173 argument as it is used to justify prohibiting a woman’s use
of pre-embryos when the man has changed his mind.  Second, this
Part draws parallels between the medical risk associated with natural
pregnancies and the egg extraction process in IVF, and argues that a
woman’s bodily integrity is implicated under both circumstances.
Third, this Part argues that giving a woman authority over her pre-
embryos makes the most sense because, generally, no third party sur-
rogacy issues will be implicated.  Finally, this Part argues that giving
women full decisional authority over their pre-embryos will give par-
ties notice of their respective rights upon creation of the pre-embryos,
thereby allowing the parties to make an informed decision about
whether or not to undergo IVF.
1. The Faulty Logic Behind the Argument Against “Forced
Procreation”
IVF has revolutionized the process of reproduction by extracting
the moment of fertilization from inside the woman’s body and bring-
ing it outside.174  When a man and woman conceive naturally, the mo-
ment of fertilization occurs inside the woman’s body after a man
ejaculates during vaginal intercourse.175  From the very moment that a
173. The term “forced procreation” was first used by Massachusetts when it held in A.Z. v.
B.Z that “[a]s a matter of public policy, we conclude that forced procreation is not an area
amenable to judicial enforcement.”  A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–58 (Mass. 2000).  Other
pre-embryo disposition cases have adopted A.Z.’s reasoning even if not explicitly using the
phrase “forced procreation.” See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001) (“We will not
force J.B. to become a biological parent against her will.”).  Therefore, as used in this Comment,
the term “forced procreation” refers to the situation that arises when a woman exercises her
exclusive, court-sanctioned right to determine either whether (1) to continue a natural preg-
nancy against the desires of the father; or (2) if conceiving through IVF, to implant her pre-
embryos and allow them to develop into a child against the desires of the father.
174. IVF is the joining of a woman’s egg and a man’s sperm in a laboratory dish. In Vitro
Fertilization (IVF), N.Y. TIMES HEALTH GUIDE (Feb. 26, 2012), http://health.nytimes.com/
health/guides/surgery/in-vitro-fertilization-ivf/overview.html.  The term in vitro is Latin for the
phrase “in glass,” which refers to the laboratory, or petri, dish where the genetic material is
combined; though the term is used to connote “outside of the body.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (2002).
175. Pregnancy: Fertilization and Implantation, NYU LANGONE MED. CENTER, http://www
.med.nyu.edu/sti/contented35.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).  During vaginal intercourse,
sperm is ejaculated into the female body. Id. The sperm makes its way up the through the
cervix, continues its way through the uterus into the fallopian tubes, and finds its way towards
the egg in approximately twenty minutes. Id. The fertilization process is complete about eigh-
teen hours after the sperm has found the egg. Id.
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man’s sperm fertilizes her egg, the woman attains exclusive decisional
authority over the fate of her embryo.176  The man can neither legally
force her to continue with the pregnancy nor force her to terminate
it.177  In the context of a natural pregnancy, therefore, the law has
specifically sanctioned the possibility of a woman to both “deprive a
man of his right to become a parent or force him to become one
against his will.”178  Yet within the IVF context, the courts have relied
on the public policy argument against “forced procreation” as a justifi-
cation to side with the party that has changed his mind regarding use
of the pre-embryos.179
That a woman has absolute discretionary authority to determine the
future of her pre-embryo has major implications on the frozen pre-
embryo custody analysis.  It introduces the question of whether or not
and why a woman who is incapable of naturally conceiving should
have different constitutional rights regarding the fate of her embryos
than a woman who naturally conceives.180  In the context of natural
pregnancies, the Supreme Court has not held that parties must con-
tract with one another prior to conception, or that courts must “bal-
ance the interests” of the respective parties in terminating the
pregnancy.  Nor has it held that “the parties must mutually agree”
176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–66 (1973) (holding that under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s decision whether to terminate her pregnancy);
see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898–901 (1992) (holding that the
spousal awareness requirement for abortion is unconstitutional because it places an “undue bur-
den” on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 67–69 (1976) (holding that a spousal consent requirement is unconstitutional).
177. See cases cited supra note 176.
178. See Anna Smajdor, Deciding the Fate of Disputed Embryos: Ethical Issues in the Case of
Natalie Evans, J. EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL ASSISTED REPRODUCTION (July 4, 2007), http://
archive.biomedcentral.com/1743-1050/4/2.
In fact men’s supposed rights not to become genetic parents are routinely overrid-
den.  Once a woman is pregnant it is widely accepted that her partner cannot force her
to undergo abortion. The unwilling father is simply obliged to accept the woman’s
choice.  The greater weight given to the woman’s choice demonstrates the importance
we place on deciding what is done to our own bodies.
Id.; see also Armin Brott, Abortion: Not Just a Women’s Issue, ASK MR. DAD (June 6, 2012),
http://www.mrdad.com/ask-mr-dad/abortion-womens-issue/.
179. Waldman, supra note 167, at 1061–62 (discussing the undue weight given to the interests
of the parent who wishes to avoid procreation perpetuated by a judicial misconception regarding
the financial and psychological toll on that parent).
180. Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process: Develop-
ing an Equality Model To Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 455, 466 (1999).
In the context of [assisted reproductive technologies], however, perhaps in an effort to
create gender equality, courts have focused not on the act and intent of the parties, but
on the physical location of the embryo.  In doing so, the courts have created an inequal-
ity for infertile women that is fundamentally unfair.
Id.
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whether to terminate the pregnancy.181  Rather, the Court has author-
ized the woman to make the decision for herself, a decision that may
result in an outcome that is disfavored by the man.182  If the woman
decides to have the child despite the man’s wishes not to become a
parent—a course of action that the Court has explicitly approved—he
has no legal recourse.183
The reality that the Supreme Court has taken a strong position by
giving women full decisional authority in natural pregnancy cases is
demonstrated by the existence of the “Fathers’ Rights” movement.184
Proponents of the Fathers’ Rights movement185 argue that it is a glar-
ing problem that fathers must pay child support even in instances
where they did not desire to have the child and yet have no say in the
abortion decision when they do want to have the child.186  The move-
ment recognizes that in order for these concerns to change, men (or
those supporting the movement) will have to “organize and demand
that the laws be changed.”187  This would be no small feat, considering
that Roe, Casey, and Danforth would all need to be overturned in or-
der for this type of change in the law to go forward.188
Thus, because the Supreme Court has in fact judicially authorized
instances of “forced procreation” within the natural pregnancy con-
text, the efficacy of the argument applied to IVF pre-embryo custody
disputes is severely diminished.  Carving out different rights for
women who conceive through IVF, as opposed to women who con-
181. Daar, supra note 180, at 466.
The decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy in its early stages rests solely with
the woman.  But Davis and its progeny disavow this sacrosanct principle, allowing the
fortuity of technology to award a male progenitor an opportunity to override a
woman’s fundamental right to control her early embryo.  With coital reproduction,
once a man takes action that could result in a pregnancy, he waives his right to control
the fate of his progeny.
Id.
182. In the abortion cases, the Court’s analysis focuses almost exclusively on the woman with
very little attention paid to the man’s interests. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
183. Darr, supra note 180, at 465.
184. See Nathan Tabor, The Third Victim of Abortion, PUBLICEYE.ORG (2009), http://
www.publiceye.org/ark/reproductive-justice/articles/the-third-victim-of-abortion.php.
185. Proponents of the movement challenge the assumption that mothers should be afforded
more rights as parents (or in the pregnancy context, potential parents) than fathers.  Hanna
Rosin, Dad’s Day in Court: The Perception That Family Law Is Unfair to Fathers Is Not Exactly
True, SLATE (May 13, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/05/men_s_
rights_recognized_the_pro_father_evolution_of_divorce_and_paternity.html.
186. Tabor, supra note 184.
187. Id.
188. “Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires
such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is by definition, indispensable.”  Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).  For a discussion of these cases, see
supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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ceive naturally, fractures the constitutional guarantees of procreative
liberty granted to women by the Supreme Court in its abortion
jurisprudence.189
2. A Woman’s Privacy and Bodily Integrity Are Implicated in IVF
In the natural pregnancy context, part of the justification for giving
women full decisional authority is that pregnancy implicates her bod-
ily integrity.190  A woman’s bodily integrity is similarly implicated in
the IVF process and the bodily integrity justification should also be
used to give women who conceive through IVF full decisional author-
ity over their pre-embryos.  Although the IVF procedure brings the
moment of fertilization outside of the woman’s body, thereby tempo-
rarily disconnecting the woman’s body from the pregnancy, the medi-
cal evidence suggests that the IVF procedure does implicate a
woman’s privacy and bodily integrity pre-implantation.191  The distinc-
tion between the risks associated with egg extraction and the risks as-
sociated with natural conception is that a woman who has undergone
the IVF procedure to produce eggs for fertilization has willingly ex-
posed herself to the risks involved.192  However, if she is not given
189. While beyond the scope of this analysis, it is interesting to note that granting different
constitutional rights to infertile women might violate the Equal Protection Clause.  The Four-
teenth Amendment provides that no state shall deny to any person “within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  In order to bring an equal protection
claim, an individual must show that the laws of a state treat an individual arbitrarily and in a
different manner than others in similar conditions and circumstances. See Equal Protection: An
Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equal_protection (last visited
Sept. 4, 2014).  Generally, the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause has been vio-
lated arises when a state grants a particular class of individuals the right to engage in an activity
but denies other individuals the same right. Id. There is no clear rule for deciding when a
classification is unconstitutional.  Id.
190.
State restrictions on abortion violate a woman’s right of privacy in two ways.  First,
compelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a woman’s right to bodily integ-
rity by imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of physical harm.
During pregnancy, women experience dramatic physical changes and a wide range of
health consequences.  Labor and delivery pose additional health risks and physical de-
mands.  In short, restrictive abortion laws force women to endure physical invasions far
more substantial than those this Court has held to violate the constitutional principle of
bodily integrity in other contexts.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
191. See Marcia Joy Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implica-
tions, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1082–83 (1986) (detailing the surgical procedure necessary to
remove a woman’s egg); see also Trespalacios, supra note 166, at 825 (detailing how the female
gamete is extracted compared to how the male gamete is extracted and concluding “[t]he woman
makes a greater investment in creating the pre-embryo”); Waldman, supra note 167, at 1053.
192. See Daar, supra note 180, at 462.
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decisional authority over her pre-embryos and is denied the ability to
use them, then her bodily integrity is implicated again.193  Thus, apart
from the proposition that consistent, nondiscriminatory application of
the law is generally desired, the fact that the egg extraction process in
IVF implicates a woman’s bodily integrity, just as a natural pregnancy
does, justifies consistent application.194
At the first stage of the IVF process, a woman has to take hormone-
stimulating fertility drugs.195  Many of these fertility drugs are given
by injection, some several times a day.196  Repeated injections can
cause bruising, and the woman may also experience bloating, abdomi-
nal pain, mood swings, headaches, and other side effects in response
to the fertility medicine.197  In some instances, the drugs may lead to a
serious condition known as ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome.198
Furthermore, during this stage in the process, the woman will have
regular transvaginal ultrasounds to examine the ovaries and blood
tests to check hormone levels.199  A transvaginal ultrasound is a type
of pelvic ultrasound used to look at a woman’s reproductive organs,
including the uterus, ovaries, cervix, and vagina.200 To perform the
With in vitro conception, a woman clearly intends that her actions result in procreation.
She often endures weeks of injections, hormone therapy and invasive treatments for
egg retrieval with the ultimate purpose of having a child.  Thus, if the law recognizes
that parties to an in vivo conception are within the realm of reproductive liberties, it
should follow that parties to an in vitro conception, who intend to procreate, also impli-
cate the realm of reproductive liberties.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs
Are Not, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1072 (1996) (discussing the physical, mental, and emotional
trauma associated with reproductive technology procedures).  Women willingly undergo this
pain on the understanding that it will result in a child. See Colker, supra, at 1072 (“She exper-
ienced considerable mental and physical pain due to the IVF process, which she would not have
undergone but for her mutual understanding with [her partner] that they would jointly beget a
child.”).
193. See Waldman, supra note 167, at 1029, 1061 (arguing that the significant emotional and
physical investment women have in existing embryos weighs heavily in favor of implantation).
194. “[T]he crucial distinction is not between discrimination based upon gender; rather, they
argue that the law discriminates against women who must undergo IVF to have a genetic child,
while granting protected status to women who conceive through intercourse.”  Shirley Darby
Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and Proposed State Regulation, 14
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407, 427–28 (2013).
195. The fertility drugs increase egg production. In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 174.  Nor-
mally, a woman produces one egg every month, but the fertility drugs cause the ovaries to pro-
duce several eggs at a time. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Fact Sheet: Risks of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), AM. SOC’Y FOR REPRO. MED., http://
www.asrm.org/FACTSHEET_Risks_of_In_Vitro_Fertilization/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
199. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 174.
200. Transvaginal Ultrasound, N.Y. TIMES HEALTH GUIDE (July 11, 2012), http://health.ny
times.com/health/guides/test/transvaginal-ultrasound/overview.html.
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procedure, the woman must lie down on a table with her knees bent
and her feet in holders.201  A healthcare provider then uses an instru-
ment called a transducer, or probe, which will generate computer
images of her reproductive organs.202  Before inserting the probe into
the patient’s vagina, the healthcare provider covers the probe in a
condom and lubricant gel.203  After inserting the probe, the healthcare
provider will move the probe within the area to see the pelvic
organs.204
The next stage of the process is egg removal, which involves sur-
gery.205  The surgery presents risks both from the administration of
anesthesia and from the procedure itself.  The short-term risks from
the procedure include bleeding, infection, inflammation, and injury to
the surrounding structures, including the bowel and bladder.206  Fur-
thermore, there is a disconcerting absence of quality studies on the
long-term risks of the IVF process on women who undergo the
procedure.207
Thus, a woman undoubtedly exposes herself both in terms of pri-
vacy and medical risk in the pre-implantation IVF process.208  This
becomes especially clear when contrasted against the pre-implantation
obligation of the sperm donor in the IVF process—ejaculating into a
cup, an activity that involves no medical risk and that takes place in
complete privacy.209  Because the process of undergoing IVF is signifi-
cantly riskier and more complicated for a woman than a man, she
should, absent an agreement providing otherwise, retain decisional





205. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 174.
206. Cynthia McFadden et al., Inside the Lucrative Life of an Egg Donor, ABC NEWS (Nov. 4,
2013, 7:28 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2013/11/04/inside-the-lucrative-life-of-an-
egg-donor/.
207. At this point, the evidence is inconclusive regarding the safety of the procedure on a
woman’s long-term health.  Susan B. Apel, Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Are Contracts the
Solution?, VT. B.J., Mar. 2001, at 29, 31 (“While [IVF procedures] are believed to be safe, the
large doses of necessary hormones have effects that are unknown.”).
208. Trespalacios, supra note 166, at 822 n.133 (“The woman has a greater physical investment
in the pre-embryo because the process that culminates in the harvesting of ova is far more physi-
cally arduous than the donation of sperm.”).
209. See Waldman, supra note 167, at 1052–53 (“Men’s donation may be achieved relatively
easily and without high-tech interventions.  All that is required is a private room, an empty jar
and, perhaps, a Playboy magazine or video.  For women, the process is more arduous.”).
210. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 192, at 1075 (“[R]egardless of the initial reason why a couple
chose IVF, in most cases the woman suffers more significantly from the denial of custody of the
frozen embryos than the man.”); Trespalacios, supra note 166, at 828–29 (“Their mutual intent at
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3. Third Party Legal Issues Will Not Necessarily Be Implicated
Another factor weighing in favor of granting the woman decisional
authority over the pre-embryos is that she can use or dispose of them
without implicating a third party, which would further obfuscate the
already murky landscape of rights in the pre-embryo custody issue.
An individual’s genetic material is considered his or her personal
property;211 separately, an egg belongs to the woman and sperm be-
longs to the man.212  Custodial issues over the pre-embryo, which is
the product of the progenitors’ reproductive materials, arise because
there is no way to separate the combined materials back into their
respective parts—the pre-embryo is irrevocably and inseparably a uni-
fied sum of genetic parts and property rights.213
Were a man to use the pre-embryos against the wishes of the
woman who provided the eggs, he would necessarily require a surro-
gate to carry the embryos to term.214  This means that the woman’s
genetic property would be implanted into a third party who has no
distinct right to the pre-embryos without the woman’s consent.215  Al-
ternatively, if the woman were to use the pre-embryos against the
man’s desire, she would likely be able to carry the embryos to term on
her own, meaning that the pre-embryos would be developed by one of
the original progenitors.216  In the latter scenario, there are no third
party use issues to consider.217
the time of IVF is demonstrated by the physical, financial, and emotional investment of both
parties in committing to IVF.”); Daar, supra note 180, at 466 (“All women should have equal
control over their early embryos and fetuses.  Courts have shown a willingness to override the
reproductive rights of infertile women whose embryos are conceived in vitro, because such
women lack direct physical relationships with their developing or cryopreserved embryos.”).
211. See Joke & Have, supra note 11.
212. Id.
213. See Theresa M. Erickson & Megan T. Erickson, What Happens to Embryos When a Mar-
riage Dissolves?: Embryo Disposition and Divorce, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 469, 481 (2009).
214. Nicholas Blincoe, Why Men Decide To Become Single Dads, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/nov/02/men-single-dad-father-surrogacy-adoption.
215. See generally B. Bjorkman & S. O. Hansson, Bodily Rights and Property Rights, 32 J.
MED. ETHICS 209 (2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2565785/.
“Turning to biological material, there is a long tradition of treating the rights that one has to
one’s bodily parts as inalienable.” Id. at 212.
216. A woman must have a healthy uterus to have the pre-embryos implanted in her womb.
Having A Baby After Cancer: Fertility Assistance and Other Options, CANCER.NET (Jan. 2013),
http://www.cancer.net/survivorship/life-after-cancer/having-baby-after-cancer-fertility-assistance-
and-other-options.  However, uterine problems are far less common than ovarian/egg quality
problems, and a woman who is only infertile due to egg quality problems does not necessarily
require a surrogate. See id. Thus, chemotherapy treatment may reduce the number of eggs in a
woman’s ovary while still allowing her to gestate upon implantation of a pre-embryo. Id.
217. Waldman, supra note 167, at 1060–61.
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4. Parties Will Have Complete Notice of the Consequences of IVF
Finally, giving full decisional authority over the pre-embryos to the
woman puts parties contemplating IVF on notice of their respective
rights, or lack thereof, in the event of a change of mind.218  Rather
than a natural pregnancy, which can occur unplanned, IVF necessarily
requires forethought.  With this notice and forethought, parties would
be able to consider the implications of a change of mind prior to going
through the process of IVF and pre-embryo freezing.219  Furthermore,
arguably, because the parties would know of the consequences of a
change of mind prior to intentionally conceiving through IVF, the de-
cision cannot be said to be “forced.”
Thus, giving women who conceive through IVF the same rights over
their pre-embryos as women who conceive naturally is a simple, le-
gally consistent, and fair solution to the growing pre-embryo dispute
problem.
IV. IMPACT
This Part explains how Illinois can give women exclusive decisional
authority of their pre-embryos, considering the (1) legal implications;
(2) public policy issues; (3) psychological and emotional effects; and
(4) financial effects that either congressional legislation or a court rul-
ing giving women exclusive decisional authority over their pre-em-
bryos would have.
A. The Illinois Supreme Court Should Give Women Exclusive
Rights to Their Pre-Embryos
Although the Illinois Supreme Court declined to weigh in on
Szafranski,220 the attorneys for both parties believe the frozen pre-
When assigning weight to the myriad of interests that the women and men in frozen
embryo cases seek to fulfill in frozen embryo disputes, courts should accord substantial
weight only to those interests that lie at the heart of the parent–child bond sheltered by
the Constitution.  Thus, women who seek to use existing embryos to achieve genetic
parenthood should be accorded the greatest judicial deference.
Id.
218. Cf. John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50
EMORY L.J. 989, 1020–21 (2001) (analogizing the rights of a women impregnated by coital con-
ception to those of a women who endures bodily intrusion through IVF procedures in reliance
on the promise that she would be able to implant the pre-embryo).
219. Cf. Charla M. Burill, Note, Obtaining Procreational Autonomy Through the Utilization of
Default Rules in Embryo Cryopreservation Agreements: Indefinite Freezing Equals an Indefinite
Solution, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1365, 1379 (2008) (discussing the benefits of using default rules in
the context of embryo disposition disputes).
220. Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
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embryo custody issue will eventually be taken on by the high court.221
That the Illinois Supreme Court will eventually hear the issue,
whether in Szafranski or another pre-embryo dispute case, seems in-
evitable.  If and when the court takes on the issue, it will have the
opportunity to either affirm the appellate court’s decision to follow a
hybrid contract and balancing of interests approach, or overrule this
decision and impose another rule.  The appropriate resolution would
be for the court to overrule the appellate court and hold that, in Illi-
nois, women who conceive using IVF should have the same rights to
their pre-embryos as women who conceive naturally.
B. The Illinois Legislature Should Give Women Exclusive Rights
to Their Pre-Embryos
Another way for Illinois to ensure that women who conceive
through IVF are afforded the same rights as women who conceive
naturally is through the passage of legislation specifically mandating
so.  Illinois currently has some legislation relating to assisted repro-
duction, including the Gestational Surrogacy Act222 and the Illinois
Parentage Act,223 which indicates that IVF issues are on the Illinois
General Assembly’s radar.
Furthermore, the legislature recently amended the Illinois Human
Rights Act (IHRA) to add pregnancy to the list of classes protected
against discrimination.224  IHRA defines pregnancy as “pregnancy,
childbirth, or medical or common conditions related to pregnancy or
childbirth.”225  Arguably, infertility is a medical condition related to
pregnancy or childbirth.  The IHRA’s definition of pregnancy paral-
lels the definition in the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which
the Seventh Circuit has interpreted to include women undergoing in-
fertility treatments.226  Thus, the Seventh Circuit has set a precedent
to consider that women who conceive through IVF fall under the stat-
utory definition of “pregnancy” and are not to be discriminated
against on the basis of their infertility.  Therefore, the Illinois legisla-
ture should further amend the IHRA to specifically include women
who have conceived through IVF as protected under the class of preg-
221. Maloney, supra note 125, at 1.
222. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1–75 (2015).
223. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/1–28.
224. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/2-102.
225. Id.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012); see also Katie Kushing, Facing Reality: The Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act Falls Short for Women Undergoing Infertility Treatment, 40 SETON HALL L. REV.
1697, 1697–98 (2010) (discussing the holding in Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008)).
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nancy, indicating that these women are not to be afforded separate,
inferior rights to women who conceive “naturally.”
C. The Effects of Giving Women Exclusive Decisional Authority
1. Legal Implications
A positive legal implication of giving women who conceive with
IVF exclusive decisional authority over their pre-embryos is that the
law in Illinois would be consistent with the national policy, evidenced
in the United State Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, of al-
lowing women alone to determine whether or not to become a mother
and ensure that infertile women are not afforded separate, inferior
rights based on their infertility status.227  However, because real dif-
ferences do exist between IVF and natural pregnancy, this ruling
would also raise a variety of complex legal questions pertaining to the
scope of the mother’s rights in light of these differences.  What are the
rights and responsibilities of the sperm donor to the children after the
woman makes a decision regarding whether to implant her pre-em-
bryos and allow them to develop?  Will he necessarily become the le-
gal father of the child even if he opposed the development of the pre-
embryos?  Will couples be able to enter into contracts regarding the
father’s rights and responsibilities to the child?  Should the mother’s
ability to use the pre-embryos depend on how many children the
couple initially agreed to have from the frozen pre-embryos?  For in-
stance, if the father and mother agreed to have only one child, but
froze several pre-embryos to serve as backup in case of failed implan-
tations, should the mother have the right to only one child, based on
consent, or should she have the right to have as many children as she
wants from the available pre-embryos?
Although these issues will need to be resolved in light of the sug-
gested ruling, establishing the rule concerning custody of pre-embryos
is nonetheless critical to ensure consistency and fairness, and should
therefore be adopted.  The courts or the legislature can later refine the
ramifications of the rule.
2. Public Policy
Giving women who conceive through IVF exclusive authority over
their pre-embryos also makes sense from a public policy standpoint.
First, because rights are explicitly defined from the outset, parties
have notice about the consequences of their decision to undergo IVF.
This notice also legitimizes the fairness of the rule giving the mother
227. See Smajdor, supra note 178.
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exclusive decisional authority over the pre-embryos because parties
know the exact outcome of having a change of mind prior to undergo-
ing IVF and can make the decision whether or not to continue based
on this notice.  Second, because the outcome of any dispute regarding
the development of the pre-embryos is predetermined by the rule, the
rule promotes judicial efficiency—parties will not spend time, money,
emotional energy, or the courts’ limited resources litigating a complex
and unpredictable suit.
Overall, judicial efficiency, consistency, and predictability in the ap-
plication of the law are positive public policy considerations that this
rule would promote, justifying its adoption.
3. Psychological and Emotional Effects
The psychological and emotional effects of a rule that may require a
man to become a parent against his will are already being played out
in the Szafranski saga.  Jacob fears that “being a genetic father of a
child he will not raise, born to a woman he never loved, will ‘haunt
[him] wherever [he] go[es].’”228  “He says the prospect alone has al-
ready cost him a relationship with another woman, one he said he was
in love with.”229  Jacob’s reaction to this potential unwanted father-
hood demonstrates the moral harm, discussed earlier, that comes with
forcing someone to become a genetic parent against his will.230
Forced genetic parenthood can cause stress and produce negative con-
sequences, such as loss of a later partner who is upset by the fact of
her partner’s parenthood.231
However, “the stress of the non-fulfillment of a wish for a child has
been associated with emotional sequelae such as anger, depression,
anxiety, marital problems, sexual dysfunction, and social isolation,”
with women generally experiencing higher levels of distress than their
male partners.232  Evidence of this particular kind of emotional stress
can also be found in Szafranski.  Court records show that in an e-mail
sent to Jacob in 2010, Karla wrote, “Those embryos mean everything
to me. . . . And I will fight this to the bitter end.”233  Since the lawsuit
began, Karla gave birth to a child using a donor egg and donor
228. Strom, supra note 18, at 37.
229. Id.
230. See Kronman, supra note 141, at 783.
231. See Strom, supra note 18, at 37.
232. Fertility and Mental Health, MGH CENTER FOR WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH, http://wo
mensmentalhealth.org/specialty-clinics/infertility-and-mental-health/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
233. Bellware, supra note 127.
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sperm.234  Here, however, the court distinguished between a child that
is biological and “essentially adopted,” leading the court to find on
remand that Karla’s “desire to have a biological child in the face of
the impossibility of having one without using the embryos out-
weighs paternity rights or decision now to not procreate.”235
A rule that gives women who conceive through IVF exclusive deci-
sional authority over their pre-embryos would therefore mitigate, at
least in part, the negative psychological effects associated with infertil-
ity for women.
4. Financial Effects
Along with having a direct financial impact on the parties involved
in a dispute, the rule would also raise certain legal questions, the reso-
lution of which would have significant financial effects on the parties.
First, the rule saves parties money on hiring attorneys to draft agree-
ments and adjudicate change-of-mind disputes because the outcome is
clear from the onset—the woman will win.  However, this rule may
cost parties money if they have already invested in drafting an agree-
ment.  Second, the rule raises the questions of whether (1) a man who
has changed his mind about becoming a father will be required to pay
child support for the unwanted child; and (2) whether the man can be
reimbursed for the costs associated with the IVF process if he helped
with those payments.  Primarily, however, the rule will save the par-
ties money by providing the issue with predictability of outcome and
obviating the need for expensive litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Only six state supreme courts so far have issued a ruling on how
frozen pre-embryo custody battles should be resolved.236  Illinois,
however, may be the next state to have the issue heard by its highest
court.237  Because the stakes in pre-embryo custody disputes are often
234. Kaye Wonderhouse, Cancer Survivor Karla Dunston Wins Custody to Embryos, Boy-
friend No Longer Wants Kids, GLOBAL DISPATCH (May 18, 2014), http://www.theglobaldispatch
.com/cancer-survivor-karla-dunston-wins-custody-to-embryos-boyfriend-no-longer-wants-kids-
11837/.
235. Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. Davis v. Davis, 842 S,W,2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998);
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Litowitz v.
Litowitz (In re Marriage of Litowitz), 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); In re Marriage of Witten, 672
N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 2003).
237. See Bob Roberts, Appeals Court Hears Arguments in Custody Dispute over Frozen Em-
bryos, CBS CHI. (Dec. 2, 2014, 9:19PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/12/02/custody-dispute-
over-frozen-embryos-lands-in-illinois-appeals-court/.
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highly emotional for the parties involved, this area of the law would
greatly benefit from a predictable, consistent, and objective solution
to the issue—giving mothers full decisional authority over their pre-
embryos.  The Illinois legislature or the Illinois Supreme Court should
act to ensure that women who conceive through IVF are afforded
same rights as women who conceive naturally.
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